ENCOS Ethernet II firmware - embedded symbol table (extracted 2026-07-26)¶
The 68000 firmware image carries its own linker symbol table. Complete extraction: 255 records, 241 unique names.
These are Norsk Data's OWN names for their routines and data objects. They beat anything a reverse engineer would invent, and they are the fastest route to a readable disassembly of this image. 191 have been applied to the Ghidra database; see "What was applied".
Provenance¶
| Source binary | ..\encos-ser-all-banks-68k.bin (524,288 bytes, MC68000 big-endian, load base 0x0) |
| Table location | file offset 0x663E0 .. 0x689FF |
| Record stride | 32 bytes, 32-byte aligned |
| Extracted | 2026-07-26, by direct byte scan of the image |
TWO BLOCKS - read this before using an address¶
The table is in two parts, and only the second has usable flat addresses.
| Block | File range | Records | Trailing link | Addresses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unbound | 0x663E0 - 0x665BF | 14 | ff ff 00 00 |
segment-relative; several are 0x08xxxxxx and are NOT load addresses |
| bound | 0x66BE0 - 0x689FF | 241 | 18 00 <off>, <off> = file offset - 0x663A0 |
flat, directly usable |
Link formula verified: record at 0x66BE0 carries 18 00 08 40, and 0x66BE0 - 0x663A0 = 0x840;
0x66C00 carries 18 00 08 60 -> 0x860. The gap 0x665C0 - 0x66BDF is zero fill.
Do not apply an unbound-block address without checking it. Some are real (ND100_CPU ->
0x64E is the ND-100 system-number config cell, independently confirmed); others such as
END_SYSTEM -> 0x4660 are segment markers that collide with a real routine (0x4660 is
calc_crc32), and applying them would destroy a correct name.
Record layout [V - verified by decoding and cross-checking]¶
+0 1 name length (observed 1..12). NAMES ARE TRUNCATED TO 12 CHARS.
+1 1 flag. Observed 0x00 and 0x10 only. UNDECODED - would need the ND linker.
+2 1 0x02 = defined (236 records); 0xff = external / segment marker (19 records)
+3 1 segment / class. 0x10 = code, 0x16 = card DRAM data; others rare (see below)
+4..7 4 32-bit address, big-endian
+8..11 4 always zero in every record observed
+12.. n name, `name length` bytes, ASCII, not NUL-terminated
+26..31 6 trailing link - see the two-block table above
Verification: INITLANCE -> 0x48EA and the routine there programs the LANCE; LANCEINITB ->
0x18810 is the LANCE init block; LNMAPHYSIC -> 0x1885E is the station MAC buffer. All three were
established independently by disassembly before this table was found. Spot checks at 0x70CC,
0xB46A, 0x10772 all land exactly on 2F 0E (move.l A6,-(SP)), the PLANC prologue - no symbol
lands mid-instruction.
Caveats¶
- Names are truncated to 12 characters.
LNMAPHYSICisLNMAPHYSICALADDRESS;RCVCOMPLETisRCVCOMPLETE;XMTRINGAPPisXMTRINGAPPEND. Where the full name is known from elsewhere, the longer form is more faithful - the truncation is the table's, not the vendor's. - Duplicate names are legitimate - same name at different addresses in different segments
(
BUFFER_ENDx3,BUFFER_STAx3,END_FREEx2). Match on segment as well as name. - The +1 byte is undecoded; +2 and +3 meanings are inferred from distribution, not read from linker code. Treat the segment mapping as a working hypothesis.
What was applied to Ghidra¶
A first naming pass applied ~191 names. Two later verification passes - one for code, one for data -
checked every bound record and completed the work. All 227 in-scope records (144 code + 83 data)
now carry their vendor name. The three categories deliberately never applied are the 19 +2 = 0xff
markers, the 14 unbound-block records, and any address where a longer un-truncated form of the same
vendor identifier already existed.
Verification pass (2026-07-26, first agent) - code half, segment 0x10¶
In scope (seg 0x10, +2 = 0x02, bound) |
144 |
| Already correct | 57 |
| Renamed from a reverse-engineer's invented name | 16 |
| Newly created as functions (bytes were undefined, or code with no function) | 71 |
| Skipped | 3 (the +2 = 0xff markers in this segment) |
| Failed | 0 |
Program function count went 187 -> 288, verified by a full list_functions re-read afterwards.
So the first pass had labelled many code addresses without creating functions there; this pass fixed
that.
Notable groups recovered:
- The card's own XMSG primitive layer:
XMPFOPN,XMPFGET,XMPFGST,XMPFWRI,XMPFRCV,XMPFRTN,XMPFPRV,XMPFDUM,XMPFDCT,XMPFALM,XMPFMST,XMPFPST,XMPOPNM,XMPCLNM,XMPREAD,XMPWRTE,XMPROUTand ~15 more. NoteXMPFDUM/XMPFDCTmirror the host-sideXFDUM/XFDCTMON 200B function names - the card runs its own XMSG primitive set. - The PLANC runtime, under the vendor's own
#-prefixed names:#APPD,#REMV,#MOVE,#IMU,#IDV,#IMOD,#INBY,#UTBY,#GETNO,#OUTBYT,#ERROR,#SPASI,#XRET,#ERET,#PRERR,#INSE,#BCPC,#UTI4,#INBYT. (Ghidra accepts#in symbol names.) - Monitor-call stubs
MON0,MON1,MON2,MON64,MON65. - PIOCOS processes
POMNPROCES@ 0x7BA2 andPOCSPROCES@ 0xE380 - which independently confirm the process directory the data pass found atPOGDPROCES(0x2D338), where those same two code addresses appear as directory entries.
Address-quality verdict: high. 144 of 144 landed on a valid instruction boundary and 141 on the
exact 2F 0E (move.l A6,-(SP)) PLANC prologue. The three that do not are structurally explicable -
MON65 is a one-instruction jsr thunk, MON0 is moveq #0,D0 ; trap #2, and MON64 falls
through into them. Computed function bodies tile sensibly: REINITRING (0x5722-0x5847) ends exactly
one byte before STARTMA at 0x5850.
One anchor correction worth carrying forward: an earlier pass named 0x6ECE LNMAINIT_main. The
vendor's LNMAINIT is at 0x6EAA, a different 14-byte routine. Both now exist; 0x6ECE keeps its
invented name with the relationship noted in its comment. Do not treat 0x6ECE as LNMAINIT.
Verification pass (2026-07-26, second agent) - data half¶
All 83 in-scope segment-0x16 records (+2 = 0x02, bound block) were confirmed already correctly
named - the naming claim holds up, nothing was missing. 83 + 7 markers = 90 reconciles exactly with
the segment-0x16 count, so that enumeration is provably complete. No record in the rarer segments
(0x26 / 0x01 / 0x05 / 0x11 / 0x20) qualifies - every one is either unbound or a 0xff marker. The
data half is therefore entirely segment 0x16.
What verification did find was three defects the naming pass had left behind:
POMNON@ 0x19BBA was typed as a 4-byte pointer, which swallowedPOMNSTATUS@ 0x19BBC. The apparent pointer value 0x00010000 was never a pointer - it isPOMNON = 1followed byPOMNSTATUS = 0. Proved by instruction size:POMNERHANDLERdoestst.w (0x19bba).lat 0x705C andclr.w (0x19bba).lat 0x7084. Retypedundefined2; the second symbol is now visible.LNCNSPCOMM@ 0x1A268 was a spurious function whose body (0x1A268-0x1A28F) buriedLNCNSPDATA@ 0x1A27C.POCONFIGUR@ 0x2D350 was a spurious function whose body (0x2D350-0x2D357) buriedPODIRECTOR@ 0x2D354.
Resolved: 0x1A268 and 0x2D350 are DATA, not functions. Evidence identical for both - zero-filled
card DRAM, no callers at all, and the "instructions" are the classic all-zero decode artefact
(00 00 00 00 -> ori.b #0x0,D0b repeated). Both function bodies were removed so the concealed
symbols could be applied. That is the only destructive edit made during the pass.
35 data types applied, each justified either by the distance to the next vendor symbol or by an
instruction's operand size - 7 x undefined2 (16-bit cells) and 28 x undefined4 (mostly queue and
list heads). 13 symbols were deliberately left label-only: LNMASPCOMM, LNMASPDATA, POMNSTACK,
POMNSTATUS, POGDSTATUS, POGDPROCES, PONAPOOL, PORTPIOCPO, PORT100POO, PO100MSGTY,
POMS100POO, POMS100BUF, XMFSTACK - the gap to the next symbol is 16-100+ bytes and these are
records, pools or stacks whose extent the code does not evidence. Naming them is right; sizing them
would be a guess.
Weakest claim in that pass, flagged by its author: the Q* cells at 0x1AAA6, 0x1B22A, 0x1E22A
and 0x6632C have no following symbol to bound them and were typed undefined4 on family evidence
(every other member of the same queue-head run is a 4-byte list head). Inference, not proof.
No conflicts. Notably, the heavily-documented reverse-engineered names - g_maOperatingMode
(0x18886), g_maAddressFilterOn (0x18888), g_mode8023LengthField (0x1888A), rxpool_count
(0x188C6), the group-address list heads (0x18942 / 0x1893E) - have no vendor-table entry at all,
so they survive untouched with their comments. The Am7990InitBlock structure at 0x18810, the
byte[6] at 0x1885E and the ring header at 0x18000 are likewise intact.
Side finding: the bytes at POGDPROCES (0x2D338) are the live PIOCOS process directory -
readable 4-char process tags POMN and POCS, each followed by an 0x80xx word and a code address
(0x7BA2 = POMNPROCESS, 0xE380 = POCSPROCESS).
Distribution¶
| Segment (byte +3) | Count | Address range | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x10 | 147 | 0x4660 .. 0x13748 | END_SYSTEM |
| 0x16 | 90 | 0x0 .. 0x663DC | NIL |
| 0x26 | 5 | 0x64C .. 0x1A00 | END_FREE |
| 0x01 | 4 | 0x0 .. 0x8002856 | PIUSERMAIN |
| 0x05 | 4 | 0x80027AC .. 0x80035FC | BUFFER_END |
| 0x11 | 4 | 0x0 .. 0x0 | NONE_1 |
| 0x20 | 1 | 0x4660 .. 0x4660 | END_SYSTEM |
Full symbol table, sorted by address¶
Blk u = unbound (address suspect). +2 = 0xff means segment marker, not a real location.
| Address | Name | Seg | +1 | +2 | Blk | File offset |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0x000000 |
NIL |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0xff | 0x66BE0 | |
0x000000 |
NONE_0 |
0x11 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66C20 | |
0x000000 |
NONE_0 |
0x01 | 0x10 | 0xff | u | 0x665A0 |
0x000000 |
NONE_1 |
0x11 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66C00 | |
0x000000 |
NONE_1 |
0x01 | 0x10 | 0xff | u | 0x66580 |
0x000000 |
NONE_2 |
0x11 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66C60 | |
0x000000 |
NONE_3 |
0x11 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66C40 | |
0x00064C |
PIOC_NUMBE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66C80 | |
0x00064C |
PIOC_NUMBE |
0x26 | 0x00 | 0x02 | u | 0x66540 |
0x00064E |
ND100_CPU |
0x26 | 0x00 | 0x02 | u | 0x66560 |
0x00064E |
ND100_CPU |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66CA0 | |
0x000FC2 |
REALTIME |
0x26 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x66460 |
0x000FC2 |
REALTIME |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66CC0 | |
0x0012F4 |
BUFFER_STA |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66D00 | |
0x0012F4 |
START_FREE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0xff | 0x66CE0 | |
0x0012F4 |
START_FREE |
0x26 | 0x00 | 0xff | u | 0x66440 |
0x001A00 |
BUFFER_END |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66D40 | |
0x001A00 |
END_FREE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0xff | 0x66D20 | |
0x001A00 |
END_FREE |
0x26 | 0x00 | 0xff | u | 0x66400 |
0x004660 |
END_PIOCOS |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x66D80 | |
0x004660 |
END_SYSTEM |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0xff | 0x66D60 | |
0x004660 |
END_SYSTEM |
0x20 | 0x00 | 0xff | u | 0x664C0 |
0x0047F8 |
INTLANCE |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66DA0 | |
0x00485A |
INTPROTECT |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66DC0 | |
0x00487A |
STARTIO |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66DE0 | |
0x0048EA |
INITLANCE |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66E00 | |
0x004C26 |
FATALERROR |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66E20 | |
0x004D66 |
ASRCONNECT |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66E40 | |
0x004E42 |
WAIT |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x66E60 | |
0x005722 |
REINITRING |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66E80 | |
0x005850 |
STARTMA |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66EA0 | |
0x005880 |
STOPMA |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66EC0 | |
0x0058E0 |
HARDWAREER |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66EE0 | |
0x005AC6 |
WATCHDOGDE |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66F00 | |
0x005B60 |
RCVRINGAPP |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66F20 | |
0x005C42 |
RCVCOMPLET |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x66F40 | |
0x006054 |
XMTRINGAPP |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66F60 | |
0x0061D2 |
XMTCOMPLET |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x66F80 | |
0x0064C4 |
IOCOMPLETI |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x66FA0 | |
0x00659C |
CMDSERVICE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x66FC0 | |
0x006ACA |
DATASERVIC |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x66FE0 | |
0x006DA8 |
LNMAEVENTS |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67000 | |
0x006EAA |
LNMAINIT |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67020 | |
0x00704A |
POMNERHAND |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67040 | |
0x0070CC |
SENDERROR |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67060 | |
0x0072CA |
GETALLERRO |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67080 | |
0x0073A0 |
ANALYZEEVE |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x670A0 | |
0x007412 |
CONNECTERR |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x670C0 | |
0x007528 |
INITERRORS |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x670E0 | |
0x0076C4 |
INITSUPERK |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67100 | |
0x007776 |
INITRESOUR |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67120 | |
0x007BA2 |
POMNPROCES |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67140 | |
0x007E0E |
AUTO_START |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67180 | |
0x007E0E |
PIUSERMAIN |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x67160 | |
0x00B1EE |
LNCNEVENTS |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x671A0 | |
0x00B46A |
LNCNINIT |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x671C0 | |
0x00BCDE |
COPY |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x671E0 | |
0x00BD32 |
XMSGIOCGAT |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67200 | |
0x00BED8 |
XMRECEIVER |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67220 | |
0x00BF6A |
RECEIVEREA |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67240 | |
0x00CD4A |
PROCESSXRO |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67260 | |
0x00D1FC |
PROCESSXGA |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67280 | |
0x00D4C0 |
PROCESSXMS |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x672A0 | |
0x00E24E |
CSEVENTS |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x672C0 | |
0x00E380 |
POCSPROCES |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x672E0 | |
0x00E6B0 |
POWAITFORL |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67300 | |
0x00E73C |
PORTCREATE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67320 | |
0x00E8F4 |
PORTNAME |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67340 | |
0x00E940 |
PORTCONNEC |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67360 | |
0x00E994 |
PORTRECEIV |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67380 | |
0x00EAA6 |
PORTSEND |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x673A0 | |
0x00ED10 |
PONAREGIST |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x673C0 | |
0x00EE48 |
PONALOOKUP |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x673E0 | |
0x00EF68 |
POMSGETMES |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67400 | |
0x00F05A |
LNNDTOMAAP |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67420 | |
0x00F0AE |
LNNDFROMMA |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67440 | |
0x00F182 |
LNINHEXMAA |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67460 | |
0x00F316 |
LNOUTHEXMA |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67480 | |
0x00F4A2 |
LNPRINTMAS |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x674A0 | |
0x00FCC4 |
XMPOPNM |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x674C0 | |
0x00FF64 |
XMPCLNM |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x674E0 | |
0x00FF94 |
XMPOPCN |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67500 | |
0x010302 |
XMPINFC |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67520 | |
0x010478 |
XMPREAD |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67540 | |
0x01050C |
XMPWRTE |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67560 | |
0x0105A0 |
XMPRDHD |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67580 | |
0x0105E0 |
XMPWRHD |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x675A0 | |
0x010666 |
XMPROUT |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x675C0 | |
0x0106F0 |
XMPSEND |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x675E0 | |
0x010772 |
XMPFOPN |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67600 | |
0x0107CA |
XMPFCLS |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67620 | |
0x010820 |
XMPFGET |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67640 | |
0x010880 |
XMPFREL |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67660 | |
0x0108D6 |
XMPFGST |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67680 | |
0x010936 |
XMPFREA |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x676A0 | |
0x0109AA |
XMPFWRI |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x676C0 | |
0x010A1E |
XMPFRHD |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x676E0 | |
0x010A86 |
XMPFWHD |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67700 | |
0x010AE6 |
XMPFSND |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67720 | |
0x010B42 |
XMPFRTN |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67740 | |
0x010BA6 |
XMPFRCV |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67760 | |
0x010C4C |
XMPFRRE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67780 | |
0x010D06 |
XMPFRRH |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x677A0 | |
0x010DAC |
XMPFPST |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x677C0 | |
0x010E32 |
XMPFMST |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x677E0 | |
0x010EAA |
XMPFSCM |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67800 | |
0x010F08 |
XMPFP2M |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67820 | |
0x010F64 |
XMPFPRV |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67840 | |
0x010FBA |
XMPFDMM |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67860 | |
0x011010 |
XMPFALM |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67880 | |
0x01106E |
XMPFDUM |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x678A0 | |
0x0110BC |
XMPFDCT |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x678C0 | |
0x01110A |
XMPBLET |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x678E0 | |
0x011236 |
XMPBINI |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67900 | |
0x0112B0 |
XMPBRDY |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67920 | |
0x011312 |
XMPBAIN |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67940 | |
0x0113E2 |
XMPBADB |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67960 | |
0x011502 |
XMPBAST |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67980 | |
0x01164E |
XMPXETS |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x679A0 | |
0x011682 |
XMPXRTS |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x679C0 | |
0x0116C2 |
XMPBLENGTH |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x679E0 | |
0x0116E4 |
POSPINITIA |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67A00 | |
0x011732 |
POSIINITIA |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67A20 | |
0x01176A |
POSPSTART |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67A40 | |
0x01179C |
POSISTART |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67A60 | |
0x0117CE |
POSPSTOP |
0x10 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67A80 | |
0x01183C |
POSISTOP |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67AA0 | |
0x01186C |
POSPGETNEX |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67AC0 | |
0x0118EA |
POSIGETNEX |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67AE0 | |
0x01192A |
POSPGETALL |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67B00 | |
0x01199E |
POSIGETALL |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67B20 | |
0x011A76 |
POSPRETURN |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67B40 | |
0x011C66 |
POSIRETURN |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67B60 | |
0x011CD8 |
POSPAPPEND |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67B80 | |
0x011DC4 |
POSIAPPEND |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67BA0 | |
0x011E2A |
POSPREMOVE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67BC0 | |
0x011EF2 |
POSIREMOVE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67BE0 | |
0x011F78 |
POMNREPORT |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67C00 | |
0x012168 |
POLKLOCK |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67C20 | |
0x012212 |
POLKUNLOCK |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67C40 | |
0x01222E |
PIOCOS |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67C60 | |
0x012258 |
PO32TOSTRI |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67C80 | |
0x01249A |
#INBY |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67CA0 | |
0x012644 |
#UTBY |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67CC0 | |
0x01289E |
#UTI4 |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67CE0 | |
0x012ED8 |
#SPASI |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67D00 | |
0x012FA6 |
#ERROR |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67D20 | |
0x01302A |
#GETNO |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67D40 | |
0x01309E |
#OUTBYT |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67D60 | |
0x0130CC |
#INBYT |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67D80 | |
0x01310C |
#IMOD |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67DA0 | |
0x013148 |
#BCPC |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67DC0 | |
0x013286 |
#MOVE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67DE0 | |
0x0133E6 |
#IMU |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67E00 | |
0x01342C |
#IDV |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67E20 | |
0x0134D8 |
#INSE |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67E40 | |
0x0134E6 |
#APPD |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67E60 | |
0x013500 |
#REMV |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67E80 | |
0x013596 |
#ERET |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67EA0 | |
0x0135A8 |
#XRET |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67EC0 | |
0x0135B6 |
#PRERR |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67EE0 | |
0x0136EE |
MON64 |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67F00 | |
0x01370C |
MON65 |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67F20 | |
0x013710 |
#QUIT |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67F40 | |
0x013710 |
MON0 |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67F60 | |
0x013714 |
MON1 |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67F80 | |
0x013748 |
MON2 |
0x10 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x67FA0 | |
0x018000 |
RCVRING |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67FC0 | |
0x018408 |
XMTRING |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x67FE0 | |
0x018810 |
LANCEINITB |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68000 | |
0x018834 |
LNMASPCOMM |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68020 | |
0x018848 |
LNMASPDATA |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68040 | |
0x01885E |
LNMAPHYSIC |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68060 | |
0x018864 |
LNMAALIVE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68080 | |
0x018866 |
LNMAIOACTI |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x680A0 | |
0x018868 |
LNMAAUTORE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x680C0 | |
0x01886A |
LNMAHWERRO |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x680E0 | |
0x01886E |
LNMAHWINFO |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68100 | |
0x018872 |
LNMAFTERRO |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68120 | |
0x018876 |
LNMAFTINFO |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68140 | |
0x01887A |
LNMAFTHAND |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68160 | |
0x01887C |
LNMAFTEVEN |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68180 | |
0x01888C |
LNMASTATIS |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x681A0 | |
0x018A34 |
POSKPATTER |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x681C0 | |
0x018A38 |
POSKRG100T |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x681E0 | |
0x018A3C |
POSKRGPIOC |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68200 | |
0x018A40 |
POSKCONFIG |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68220 | |
0x018A44 |
POMNSTACK |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68240 | |
0x019BBA |
POMNON |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68260 | |
0x019BBC |
POMNSTATUS |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68280 | |
0x01A258 |
POGDSTATUS |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x682A0 | |
0x01A268 |
LNCNSPCOMM |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x682C0 | |
0x01A27C |
LNCNSPDATA |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x682E0 | |
0x01A2B0 |
NEWCSRQCMD |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68300 | |
0x01A2B4 |
NEWNLRSCMD |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68320 | |
0x01A2B8 |
NEWNLRSDAT |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68340 | |
0x01A2BC |
NEWMARQDAT |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68360 | |
0x01A2C0 |
QSERVERRBR |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68380 | |
0x01A2C4 |
QDATAFORSE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x683A0 | |
0x01A2C8 |
RETRYQCMD |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x683C0 | |
0x01A2CC |
RETRYQDATA |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x683E0 | |
0x01A2D2 |
QRETRANSMI |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68400 | |
0x01AA9A |
QFREECONN |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68420 | |
0x01AA9E |
QACTIVECON |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68440 | |
0x01AAA2 |
QWORKCONN |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68460 | |
0x01AAA6 |
QFORRBCMD |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68480 | |
0x01B22A |
QFREEXTRB |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x684A0 | |
0x01CF2E |
QFREERBRCV |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x684C0 | |
0x01D0EA |
QFREECOBF |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x684E0 | |
0x01D10A |
QFREERBCMD |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68500 | |
0x01D10E |
DELTARETRA |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68520 | |
0x01E16C |
XGATEVIAPO |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68540 | |
0x01E1CA |
POCSINTERN |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68560 | |
0x01E1DA |
POCSSYSTEM |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68580 | |
0x01E1DC |
POCSMXPDUS |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x685A0 | |
0x01E1E6 |
POCSSPCOMM |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x685C0 | |
0x01E1FA |
NEWCSRSCMD |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x685E0 | |
0x01E1FE |
NEWNLRQCMD |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68600 | |
0x01E202 |
NEWNLRQDAT |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68620 | |
0x01E20E |
XGATEMSGSW |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68640 | |
0x01E224 |
XGATE |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x68660 | |
0x01E22A |
QFREEXGATE |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68680 | |
0x01E232 |
QACTIVEDES |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x686A0 | |
0x02AB5E |
POCSTRACEB |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x686C0 | |
0x02D334 |
POGDNUMBER |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x686E0 | |
0x02D338 |
POGDPROCES |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68700 | |
0x02D350 |
POCONFIGUR |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68720 | |
0x02D354 |
PODIRECTOR |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68740 | |
0x02D36E |
PONAPOOL |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68760 | |
0x02D472 |
POPIOCPORT |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68780 | |
0x02D48C |
PORTPIOCPO |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x687A0 | |
0x02D4F4 |
PO100PORTS |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x687C0 | |
0x02D50E |
PORT100POO |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x687E0 | |
0x02D966 |
PO100MESSA |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68800 | |
0x02D980 |
PO100MSGTY |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68820 | |
0x02D9CE |
POMS100POO |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68840 | |
0x02DEFC |
POMS100BUF |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68860 | |
0x036368 |
ENMANUMBUF |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68880 | |
0x03636C |
ENMABUFFER |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x688A0 | |
0x065FF4 |
XMFSTACK |
0x16 | 0x00 | 0x02 | 0x688C0 | |
0x066318 |
POMNERRORQ |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x688E0 | |
0x06631C |
POMNFATALQ |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68900 | |
0x066320 |
POMNWAITQU |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68920 | |
0x066324 |
POMNLOCK |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68940 | |
0x066326 |
POMNEVHAND |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68960 | |
0x066328 |
POMNEVERRO |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x68980 | |
0x06632C |
POMNMISSED |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0x02 | 0x689A0 | |
0x0663DC |
DB_INFO |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x689E0 | |
0x0663DC |
USERDATA05 |
0x16 | 0x10 | 0xff | 0x689C0 | |
0x8002784 |
END_PIOCOS |
0x01 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x664E0 |
0x80027AC |
BUFFER_END |
0x05 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x66480 |
0x80027BE |
BUFFER_STA |
0x05 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x66500 |
0x8002856 |
PIUSERMAIN |
0x01 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x663E0 |
0x80035CA |
BUFFER_STA |
0x05 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x66520 |
0x80035FC |
BUFFER_END |
0x05 | 0x10 | 0x02 | u | 0x664A0 |
Alphabetical index¶
| Name | Address | Seg | Blk |
|---|---|---|---|
#APPD |
0x0134E6 |
0x10 | |
#BCPC |
0x013148 |
0x10 | |
#ERET |
0x013596 |
0x10 | |
#ERROR |
0x012FA6 |
0x10 | |
#GETNO |
0x01302A |
0x10 | |
#IDV |
0x01342C |
0x10 | |
#IMOD |
0x01310C |
0x10 | |
#IMU |
0x0133E6 |
0x10 | |
#INBY |
0x01249A |
0x10 | |
#INBYT |
0x0130CC |
0x10 | |
#INSE |
0x0134D8 |
0x10 | |
#MOVE |
0x013286 |
0x10 | |
#OUTBYT |
0x01309E |
0x10 | |
#PRERR |
0x0135B6 |
0x10 | |
#QUIT |
0x013710 |
0x10 | |
#REMV |
0x013500 |
0x10 | |
#SPASI |
0x012ED8 |
0x10 | |
#UTBY |
0x012644 |
0x10 | |
#UTI4 |
0x01289E |
0x10 | |
#XRET |
0x0135A8 |
0x10 | |
ANALYZEEVE |
0x0073A0 |
0x10 | |
ASRCONNECT |
0x004D66 |
0x10 | |
AUTO_START |
0x007E0E |
0x10 | |
BUFFER_END |
0x001A00 |
0x16 | |
BUFFER_END |
0x80027AC |
0x05 | u |
BUFFER_END |
0x80035FC |
0x05 | u |
BUFFER_STA |
0x0012F4 |
0x16 | |
BUFFER_STA |
0x80027BE |
0x05 | u |
BUFFER_STA |
0x80035CA |
0x05 | u |
CMDSERVICE |
0x00659C |
0x10 | |
CONNECTERR |
0x007412 |
0x10 | |
COPY |
0x00BCDE |
0x10 | |
CSEVENTS |
0x00E24E |
0x10 | |
DATASERVIC |
0x006ACA |
0x10 | |
DB_INFO |
0x0663DC |
0x16 | |
DELTARETRA |
0x01D10E |
0x16 | |
END_FREE |
0x001A00 |
0x16 | |
END_FREE |
0x001A00 |
0x26 | u |
END_PIOCOS |
0x004660 |
0x10 | |
END_PIOCOS |
0x8002784 |
0x01 | u |
END_SYSTEM |
0x004660 |
0x10 | |
END_SYSTEM |
0x004660 |
0x20 | u |
ENMABUFFER |
0x03636C |
0x16 | |
ENMANUMBUF |
0x036368 |
0x16 | |
FATALERROR |
0x004C26 |
0x10 | |
GETALLERRO |
0x0072CA |
0x10 | |
HARDWAREER |
0x0058E0 |
0x10 | |
INITERRORS |
0x007528 |
0x10 | |
INITLANCE |
0x0048EA |
0x10 | |
INITRESOUR |
0x007776 |
0x10 | |
INITSUPERK |
0x0076C4 |
0x10 | |
INTLANCE |
0x0047F8 |
0x10 | |
INTPROTECT |
0x00485A |
0x10 | |
IOCOMPLETI |
0x0064C4 |
0x10 | |
LANCEINITB |
0x018810 |
0x16 | |
LNCNEVENTS |
0x00B1EE |
0x10 | |
LNCNINIT |
0x00B46A |
0x10 | |
LNCNSPCOMM |
0x01A268 |
0x16 | |
LNCNSPDATA |
0x01A27C |
0x16 | |
LNINHEXMAA |
0x00F182 |
0x10 | |
LNMAALIVE |
0x018864 |
0x16 | |
LNMAAUTORE |
0x018868 |
0x16 | |
LNMAEVENTS |
0x006DA8 |
0x10 | |
LNMAFTERRO |
0x018872 |
0x16 | |
LNMAFTEVEN |
0x01887C |
0x16 | |
LNMAFTHAND |
0x01887A |
0x16 | |
LNMAFTINFO |
0x018876 |
0x16 | |
LNMAHWERRO |
0x01886A |
0x16 | |
LNMAHWINFO |
0x01886E |
0x16 | |
LNMAINIT |
0x006EAA |
0x10 | |
LNMAIOACTI |
0x018866 |
0x16 | |
LNMAPHYSIC |
0x01885E |
0x16 | |
LNMASPCOMM |
0x018834 |
0x16 | |
LNMASPDATA |
0x018848 |
0x16 | |
LNMASTATIS |
0x01888C |
0x16 | |
LNNDFROMMA |
0x00F0AE |
0x10 | |
LNNDTOMAAP |
0x00F05A |
0x10 | |
LNOUTHEXMA |
0x00F316 |
0x10 | |
LNPRINTMAS |
0x00F4A2 |
0x10 | |
MON0 |
0x013710 |
0x10 | |
MON1 |
0x013714 |
0x10 | |
MON2 |
0x013748 |
0x10 | |
MON64 |
0x0136EE |
0x10 | |
MON65 |
0x01370C |
0x10 | |
ND100_CPU |
0x00064E |
0x16 | |
ND100_CPU |
0x00064E |
0x26 | u |
NEWCSRQCMD |
0x01A2B0 |
0x16 | |
NEWCSRSCMD |
0x01E1FA |
0x16 | |
NEWMARQDAT |
0x01A2BC |
0x16 | |
NEWNLRQCMD |
0x01E1FE |
0x16 | |
NEWNLRQDAT |
0x01E202 |
0x16 | |
NEWNLRSCMD |
0x01A2B4 |
0x16 | |
NEWNLRSDAT |
0x01A2B8 |
0x16 | |
NIL |
0x000000 |
0x16 | |
NONE_0 |
0x000000 |
0x11 | |
NONE_0 |
0x000000 |
0x01 | u |
NONE_1 |
0x000000 |
0x01 | u |
NONE_1 |
0x000000 |
0x11 | |
NONE_2 |
0x000000 |
0x11 | |
NONE_3 |
0x000000 |
0x11 | |
PIOC_NUMBE |
0x00064C |
0x26 | u |
PIOC_NUMBE |
0x00064C |
0x16 | |
PIOCOS |
0x01222E |
0x10 | |
PIUSERMAIN |
0x007E0E |
0x10 | |
PIUSERMAIN |
0x8002856 |
0x01 | u |
PO100MESSA |
0x02D966 |
0x16 | |
PO100MSGTY |
0x02D980 |
0x16 | |
PO100PORTS |
0x02D4F4 |
0x16 | |
PO32TOSTRI |
0x012258 |
0x10 | |
POCONFIGUR |
0x02D350 |
0x16 | |
POCSINTERN |
0x01E1CA |
0x16 | |
POCSMXPDUS |
0x01E1DC |
0x16 | |
POCSPROCES |
0x00E380 |
0x10 | |
POCSSPCOMM |
0x01E1E6 |
0x16 | |
POCSSYSTEM |
0x01E1DA |
0x16 | |
POCSTRACEB |
0x02AB5E |
0x16 | |
PODIRECTOR |
0x02D354 |
0x16 | |
POGDNUMBER |
0x02D334 |
0x16 | |
POGDPROCES |
0x02D338 |
0x16 | |
POGDSTATUS |
0x01A258 |
0x16 | |
POLKLOCK |
0x012168 |
0x10 | |
POLKUNLOCK |
0x012212 |
0x10 | |
POMNERHAND |
0x00704A |
0x10 | |
POMNERRORQ |
0x066318 |
0x16 | |
POMNEVERRO |
0x066328 |
0x16 | |
POMNEVHAND |
0x066326 |
0x16 | |
POMNFATALQ |
0x06631C |
0x16 | |
POMNLOCK |
0x066324 |
0x16 | |
POMNMISSED |
0x06632C |
0x16 | |
POMNON |
0x019BBA |
0x16 | |
POMNPROCES |
0x007BA2 |
0x10 | |
POMNREPORT |
0x011F78 |
0x10 | |
POMNSTACK |
0x018A44 |
0x16 | |
POMNSTATUS |
0x019BBC |
0x16 | |
POMNWAITQU |
0x066320 |
0x16 | |
POMS100BUF |
0x02DEFC |
0x16 | |
POMS100POO |
0x02D9CE |
0x16 | |
POMSGETMES |
0x00EF68 |
0x10 | |
PONALOOKUP |
0x00EE48 |
0x10 | |
PONAPOOL |
0x02D36E |
0x16 | |
PONAREGIST |
0x00ED10 |
0x10 | |
POPIOCPORT |
0x02D472 |
0x16 | |
PORT100POO |
0x02D50E |
0x16 | |
PORTCONNEC |
0x00E940 |
0x10 | |
PORTCREATE |
0x00E73C |
0x10 | |
PORTNAME |
0x00E8F4 |
0x10 | |
PORTPIOCPO |
0x02D48C |
0x16 | |
PORTRECEIV |
0x00E994 |
0x10 | |
PORTSEND |
0x00EAA6 |
0x10 | |
POSIAPPEND |
0x011DC4 |
0x10 | |
POSIGETALL |
0x01199E |
0x10 | |
POSIGETNEX |
0x0118EA |
0x10 | |
POSIINITIA |
0x011732 |
0x10 | |
POSIREMOVE |
0x011EF2 |
0x10 | |
POSIRETURN |
0x011C66 |
0x10 | |
POSISTART |
0x01179C |
0x10 | |
POSISTOP |
0x01183C |
0x10 | |
POSKCONFIG |
0x018A40 |
0x16 | |
POSKPATTER |
0x018A34 |
0x16 | |
POSKRG100T |
0x018A38 |
0x16 | |
POSKRGPIOC |
0x018A3C |
0x16 | |
POSPAPPEND |
0x011CD8 |
0x10 | |
POSPGETALL |
0x01192A |
0x10 | |
POSPGETNEX |
0x01186C |
0x10 | |
POSPINITIA |
0x0116E4 |
0x10 | |
POSPREMOVE |
0x011E2A |
0x10 | |
POSPRETURN |
0x011A76 |
0x10 | |
POSPSTART |
0x01176A |
0x10 | |
POSPSTOP |
0x0117CE |
0x10 | |
POWAITFORL |
0x00E6B0 |
0x10 | |
PROCESSXGA |
0x00D1FC |
0x10 | |
PROCESSXMS |
0x00D4C0 |
0x10 | |
PROCESSXRO |
0x00CD4A |
0x10 | |
QACTIVECON |
0x01AA9E |
0x16 | |
QACTIVEDES |
0x01E232 |
0x16 | |
QDATAFORSE |
0x01A2C4 |
0x16 | |
QFORRBCMD |
0x01AAA6 |
0x16 | |
QFREECOBF |
0x01D0EA |
0x16 | |
QFREECONN |
0x01AA9A |
0x16 | |
QFREERBCMD |
0x01D10A |
0x16 | |
QFREERBRCV |
0x01CF2E |
0x16 | |
QFREEXGATE |
0x01E22A |
0x16 | |
QFREEXTRB |
0x01B22A |
0x16 | |
QRETRANSMI |
0x01A2D2 |
0x16 | |
QSERVERRBR |
0x01A2C0 |
0x16 | |
QWORKCONN |
0x01AAA2 |
0x16 | |
RCVCOMPLET |
0x005C42 |
0x10 | |
RCVRING |
0x018000 |
0x16 | |
RCVRINGAPP |
0x005B60 |
0x10 | |
REALTIME |
0x000FC2 |
0x26 | u |
REALTIME |
0x000FC2 |
0x16 | |
RECEIVEREA |
0x00BF6A |
0x10 | |
REINITRING |
0x005722 |
0x10 | |
RETRYQCMD |
0x01A2C8 |
0x16 | |
RETRYQDATA |
0x01A2CC |
0x16 | |
SENDERROR |
0x0070CC |
0x10 | |
START_FREE |
0x0012F4 |
0x26 | u |
START_FREE |
0x0012F4 |
0x16 | |
STARTIO |
0x00487A |
0x10 | |
STARTMA |
0x005850 |
0x10 | |
STOPMA |
0x005880 |
0x10 | |
USERDATA05 |
0x0663DC |
0x16 | |
WAIT |
0x004E42 |
0x10 | |
WATCHDOGDE |
0x005AC6 |
0x10 | |
XGATE |
0x01E224 |
0x16 | |
XGATEMSGSW |
0x01E20E |
0x16 | |
XGATEVIAPO |
0x01E16C |
0x16 | |
XMFSTACK |
0x065FF4 |
0x16 | |
XMPBADB |
0x0113E2 |
0x10 | |
XMPBAIN |
0x011312 |
0x10 | |
XMPBAST |
0x011502 |
0x10 | |
XMPBINI |
0x011236 |
0x10 | |
XMPBLENGTH |
0x0116C2 |
0x10 | |
XMPBLET |
0x01110A |
0x10 | |
XMPBRDY |
0x0112B0 |
0x10 | |
XMPCLNM |
0x00FF64 |
0x10 | |
XMPFALM |
0x011010 |
0x10 | |
XMPFCLS |
0x0107CA |
0x10 | |
XMPFDCT |
0x0110BC |
0x10 | |
XMPFDMM |
0x010FBA |
0x10 | |
XMPFDUM |
0x01106E |
0x10 | |
XMPFGET |
0x010820 |
0x10 | |
XMPFGST |
0x0108D6 |
0x10 | |
XMPFMST |
0x010E32 |
0x10 | |
XMPFOPN |
0x010772 |
0x10 | |
XMPFP2M |
0x010F08 |
0x10 | |
XMPFPRV |
0x010F64 |
0x10 | |
XMPFPST |
0x010DAC |
0x10 | |
XMPFRCV |
0x010BA6 |
0x10 | |
XMPFREA |
0x010936 |
0x10 | |
XMPFREL |
0x010880 |
0x10 | |
XMPFRHD |
0x010A1E |
0x10 | |
XMPFRRE |
0x010C4C |
0x10 | |
XMPFRRH |
0x010D06 |
0x10 | |
XMPFRTN |
0x010B42 |
0x10 | |
XMPFSCM |
0x010EAA |
0x10 | |
XMPFSND |
0x010AE6 |
0x10 | |
XMPFWHD |
0x010A86 |
0x10 | |
XMPFWRI |
0x0109AA |
0x10 | |
XMPINFC |
0x010302 |
0x10 | |
XMPOPCN |
0x00FF94 |
0x10 | |
XMPOPNM |
0x00FCC4 |
0x10 | |
XMPRDHD |
0x0105A0 |
0x10 | |
XMPREAD |
0x010478 |
0x10 | |
XMPROUT |
0x010666 |
0x10 | |
XMPSEND |
0x0106F0 |
0x10 | |
XMPWRHD |
0x0105E0 |
0x10 | |
XMPWRTE |
0x01050C |
0x10 | |
XMPXETS |
0x01164E |
0x10 | |
XMPXRTS |
0x011682 |
0x10 | |
XMRECEIVER |
0x00BED8 |
0x10 | |
XMSGIOCGAT |
0x00BD32 |
0x10 | |
XMTCOMPLET |
0x0061D2 |
0x10 | |
XMTRING |
0x018408 |
0x16 | |
XMTRINGAPP |
0x006054 |
0x10 |
Related: README.md - the rest of the ENCOS firmware reverse engineering. The
framing / mode-word analysis that led here is in
..\..\..\..\..\SINTRAN\XMSG\DOC\COSMOS-RE\ETHERNET-II-FEASIBILITY-AND-MODE-WORD-RE-2026-07-25.md.